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Introduction 
The automotive market, which has always been characterized by strong competitive 
pressure, has undergone drastic changes since the 1990s. This has had obvious implications 
for the management methods adopted by automobile manufacturers, who are fighting for 
survival. The change, which began in the early ‘90s, when the first strategic alliances 
between different industry groups were born, rose sharply as a result of the deep economic 
crisis that hit the Western European world at that time.  
The EU market, and to a lesser extent that of the U.S.A, is unable to absorb the production 
capacity of companies installed in its territories. As a result, it is becoming increasingly 
difficult for generalist manufacturers to make these plants profitable, except for those in 
which products also intended for export are assembled. The sales figures are unequivocal: 
in Europe in 2007, 14,776,476 units were registered (Ansa, 2008), while in 2012, the figure 
drops to 12,053,904 (Ansa, 2012), representing a percentage decline of 20%. In the 
meantime, the sales trend in the United States reveals an improvement, although this is 
minimal. The phenomenon has not only affected the Fiat group, PSA (Peugeot - Citroen), 
Renault, Opel and the VAG national trademarks, Seat and Skoda, have also been affected 
by the contraction. Some of them did not survive, for example Saab, a Scandinavian 
company which was very popular in America during ‘80s and ‘90s. Others, however, in 
order to avoid the same fate, were sold to operators in emerging countries: Jaguar and Land 
Rover are now owned by Tata (India), while Volvo has been purchased by Geely (China) 
(Jullien, 2013). 
The crisis hit generalist brands that offer products for which price is the main variable in 
purchase decisions. For high price products, however, substantial resources are required in 
order to continue technological development and guarantee product quality. Companies can 
remain competitive only if there are adequate gross product margins resulting in dividends 
for shareholders. These margins make it possible to approve future operational plans during 
the annual general meeting (Jullien, 2013).  
 In this scenario, the response of the automotive industry is reflected in an increasing 
number of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that success is not assured, since empirical research indicates that more than 50% of M&As 
fail to achieve their purpose (Papadakis, 2005), and the percentage is even higher for cross-
border M&As, which is due mainly to post-merger integration and cultural differences. 
Several approaches can be identified through analysing the automotive market. For 
instance, in terms of evolution, the rate of technological change and the lifecycle can be taken 
primarily into account (Anderson, Zeithaml, 1984; Porter, 1985; Scherer, Ross, 1990; 
Dobrev, Carroll, 2003; Lei, Slochum, 2005), or one could focus on the competitive profile 
(Lei and Slochum, 2005; Hambrick and Fredrickson, 2001). Generally speaking, the main 
characteristics appear to be market maturity, a low rate of technological evolution and a 
generally constant market share in the medium term. Capturing and sustaining cost-driven 
efficiencies is therefore essential. In the light of this scenario, the main drivers for automotive 
companies are typically the following: 
- focus on gaining access to wider markets in order to leverage fixed costs, maximizing 
the benefits of cost and process efficiencies in an attempt to achieve industry-wide 
economies of scale; 
- avoiding products that require a high degree of customization, in favor of mass 
production and the distribution of products with highly standardized contents. It 
should be noted that the standardization of products, components and technologies 
may entail difficulties in appealing to many different market segments with a 
compelling value proposition for each; 
- actively searching for new ways to reduce high capital intensity by sharing the risks 
of future product development (co-design) with suppliers, by outsourcing, or by 
becoming larger through M&As with competitors. 
In relation to the latter driver, it is interesting to note that Grinblatt and Titman (1998) suggest 
that M&As can, by themselves, be potential sources of various gains, among which the 
following can be highlighted: 1. operational synergies, centered around cost reductions or 
synergies related to economies of scale or scope, lower distribution or marketing costs, or the 
elimination of duplicate assets; 2. market-power maximization, based on the notion that the 
acquiring firms can gain monopoly power through a merger, for instance by buying out 
competitors or foreclosing suppliers; 3. value creation, by introducing more efficient 
management procedures, if the acquiring firms recognize managerial shortcomings in the 
target firms (so-called disciplinary takeovers); 4. fiscal advantages, including changes that 
occur through mergers which reduce tax liabilities. 
In M&As, the role of management in post-event integration is crucial. Haspeslagh and 
Jemison (1991) showed that the success rate was higher for acquisitions that integrate some 
members of top management of the acquired company, and particularly those most involved 
in managing critical functions. The creation of formal teams responsible for managing the 
post-negotiation phase is a condition for success which is maximized by the involvement of 
managers from the acquired firm. While a top-down approach in managing the acquired 
company seems to facilitate rapidity, consensus helps avoid the loss of competencies and 
resources resulting from the exodus of managers from the acquired firm (Walsh, 1988).  
 
2. The Fiat-Chrysler case 
From an industrial point of view, the Fiat situation in 2009 was characterized by ups 
and downs:  
- Fiat Professional, the LCV (Light Commercial Vehicles) brand, was well-positioned 
in the European rankings, with 12.8% of the market share. Fiat held a position of 
absolute strength in South America and, more specifically, in Brazil, where the 
company was the market leader and its activities were very profitable for a decade, 
generating the majority of the company’s EBIT (Earnings before Interst and Tax);  
- Fiat was a European leader in terms of technological solutions for CO2 emission 
reduction;  
- The Fiat Group’s margins were solid and very much in line with the average of the 
automotive industry, even in periods of higher pressure as a result of adverse 
macroeconomic conditions.  
On the other hand, despite occupying a good position in one of the most important 
markets, for all other BRIC countries, the market share was clearly inadequate, not to 
mention the situation in the very competitive and difficult European market: 
- Profitability appeared to be too heavily dependent on LCVs; the total volumes of Alfa 
Romeo and Lancia were not sufficiently powerful to ensure the brand self-
sustainability for the brand;   
- The main Italian production plants were underutilized;  
- Finally, the sales distribution of Fiat Group by automobile segment was too 
imbalanced towards mini and small segments (eg. Panda and Punto), which together 
comprised over 77% of the groups’ registrations in Europe, whereas the total 
European registration distribution showed a clear predominance of small, compact 
and large segments, as well as a characteristic presence of MPVs and SUVs.  
To sum up, the situation of Fiat in 2009 could be regarded as  a serious standoff: the 
growth momentum propelled by group turnaround was stifled by the global crisis, which 
in turn led to contracted revenues and higher levels of caution towards investments, even 
with respect to new models. Moreover, some sales targets were missed; this fact led firstly 
to a revival of the Lancia and Alfa Romeo brands and to the acquisition of a stable 
presence in all emerging markets, particularly China. Further growth of Fiat Group 
appeared to require a major review of the previuos strategy (e.g. targeted alliances). The 
crisis situation of Chrysler, the crisis of the automotive market in the US - generated by 
the broader financial crisis and peaking with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008 - along with the opportunity for an acquisition, all combined to offer the 
perfect occasion for a strategy revolution.  
On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, after the failed merger with Daimler-Benz and the 
acquisition of the company by the investment firm Cerberus Capital Management, Chrysler 
began 2009 with a degree of financial and economic instability that led to bankruptcy 
(Caputo, 2012). The continued decline in sales over the last ten years had brought the number 
of cars sold down from 2.6 million in 1999 to 1.4 million in 2008 (Chrysler Group LLC 
Annual Sales Reports, 1999-2008). In order to survive and repay its maturing debt 
obligations, Chrysler received some funding from the U.S. government in late 2008. 
However, the debts were tied to the achievement of a satisfactory turnaround plan, for which 
it was necessary to find an industrial partner which would provide advanced technologies. 
This was the main reason for the tentative agreement with Fiat. The CEO of Fiat, 
Marchionne, (2008) said: 
“We need to bring people around the table and say: Look guys, the party is over. 
Somebody called our bluff and we're not all going to make it so let's fix it. It may be painful. 
It may be ugly. But if we want to do the right thing for this industry, let's do it now. You need 
at least 5.5 million to 6 million cars [a year] to have a chance of making money. It is not just 
the absolute number of cars that matters, but the volume associated with each architecture. 
Fiat is not even halfway there. And we are not alone in this. So we need to aggregate, one 
way or another. “…  “Maybe I am completely wrong, but today my gut instinct is to be truly 
Draconian. By the time we finish with this, in the next 24 months, as far as mass-producers 
are concerned, we're going to end up with one American house, one German, of size; one 
European-Japanese, probably with a significant extension in the US; one in Japan; one in 
China and one other potential European player.”… “I can't afford to spend half a billion 
[euros] on doing a platform. It's not that I don't have it. I just cannot stand up in front of a 
shareholder or any other provider of capital and say that I am going to make a reasonable 
and certain return on this investment. Those days are gone.” … “The problem with car guys 
is that they always thought that they were at the upper end of the food chain and, 
unfortunately, we are all sitting at the bottom. And now the world has told us so.” … “We 
have tried every trick in the book. We sold financial services. We bought financial services. 
We sold the supplier base. We took back the supplier base. We have done all the monkey acts 
corporate life allows you to do”. 
The agreement 
The final agreement was signed on June 10, 2009. The beginning of the negotiation 
process, which led to the creation of the agreement, can be traced back to January 20, when 
Fiat and Chrysler jointly signed a non-binding letter of intent for the creation of a 'global 
strategic alliance’.  
According to the “January 20” agreement, Fiat would provide licenses permitting 
Chrysler to make use of platforms in its plants for the production of its fuel-efficient vehicles, 
engines, transmissions and components. The two companies would also have had access to 
each other’s distribution networks (Caputo, 2012). 
The letter of intent states that Fiat would have received an initial 35% stake in Chrysler, 
with an option to purchase an additional 20% after twelve months. For Fiat, the agreement 
would have meant gaining access both to selling technologies resulting in significant 
investments, and to markets with great potential, through the launch of brands such as Alfa 
Romeo and Fiat 500. It would thus resume the path of internationalization in the U.S., which 
had already been initiated and then abandoned by the company several times in the second 
half of the twentieth century. For Chrysler, on the other hand, the agreement with Fiat was a 
major part of the recovery plan that it submitted to the U.S. government and was consistent 
with the terms and conditions for the granting of the received funds: corporate restructuring 
and the conversion of production processes towards environmentally-friendly vehicles. 
In terms of governance, Fiat and Chrysler Group shared the same CEO, and an adaptation 
towards the latter company was imposed. At the same time, top management from Chrysler 
was involved in the restructuring process from the outset and the Group Executive Council 
of Fiat-Chrysler was opened up to managers from both organizations. Moreover, some 
managers from Fiat were asked to join Chrysler’s teams to help with the process of 
integration and share their competencies. Furthermore, some managers from Chrysler were 
asked to move to Turin. Generally speaking, the basic approach for defining the new Chrysler 
organization was to make the best possible use of any local resources, minimizing the 
introduction of managers from Fiat (5 Italian team members of 26 in the Chrysler 
management team). 
 
 The new entity: Fiat-Chrysler 
The acquisition of Chrysler provided Fiat Group with the opportunity to substantially re-
define its strategy, markets and products. First of all, the new Fiat-Chrysler entity acquired 
wider and diversified reference markets, through the addition of the North American market 
to the European and South American ones (Bank am Bellevue, 2012; Palmer, 2012). Data 
related to the geographical breakdown of revenue shows that the group market is strongly 
diversified, with a major shift from the home-region orientation (Rugman, Collinson, 2004) 
of Fiat ex-Chrysler in 2010 (with 60% of revenues generated in Europe and 28% in Latin 
America), to the almost global dimension of the Fiat-Chrysler combination in 2011 (with 
30% revenue generated in Europe, 47% in North America and 17% in South America). 
Nevertheless, if trading profit is considered in terms of revenue origin, there is a clear 
predominance of the North and South American areas above all others, while Europe barely 
breaks even. From this point of view, the integration with Chrysler yielded the advantage of 
further strengthening the historical solidity of the Latin American region through the positive 
results from the North American region. In terms of market share, the combination of Fiat 
and Chrysler reference markets enables the new automotive Group to play a major role in the 
Western area, from Europe to the entire American continent. Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that both Fiat and Chrysler maintain a reference role in their respective historical markets 
(Europe and Brazil for Fiat, North America and Mexico for Chrysler) and that, so far, neither 
Fiat nor Chrysler have acquired significantly more favorable positions in the markets that are 
historically more linked to their partner. Thus, even if they are almost “global” from a 
consolidated point of view (if a fourth area is taken into account, that is South America, 
according to the strong growth of Brazil above all), Fiat and Chrysler still remain “bi-
regional” or “home-region” if considered singularly on their own. 
The new Fiat-Chrysler entity commenced a strong process of integration and 
standardization that optimized design and distribution costs by achieving broader economies 
of scale. This standardization strategy focused primarly on components that are substantially 
transversal to all architectures and that constitute 70%-75% of total vehicle costs (for instance 
powertrain technology, lighting, instruments, steering systems). Attention was therefore not 
paid to the remaining components (for instance, interior and exterior trims, seats, instrument 
panels, exterior and interior lightning) that are highly specific and characterize model and 
brand identity. On the other hand, Fiat-Chrysler focused on the minimization of basic vehicle 
architectures, targeting three modular architectures shared by both Fiat Group and Chrysler 
(mini, small and compact), two specific architectures for LCVs, and low-cost vehicles as well 
as four Chrysler architectures inherited from models already in production. 
Another strength of the Fiat-Chrysler deal is the potential for sharing low-consumption 
engine technologies in order to optimize the powertrain scenario in the North American 
market, which is dominated by gasoline engines with medium-high engine capacity. For 
instance, in 2010, Chrysler had 91% gasoline engines, of which 54% were 6-cylinder and 
only 19% 4-cylinder (the closest to European standards). In order to increase power, high 
displacement engines were typically used, at the expense of consumption and pollution. 
Regulations originally introduced in California and progressively adopted by an increasing 
number of other States, by contrast, defined severe threshold limits for both fuel consumption 
and CO2 emissions. The strategy was then to leverage the experience of Fiat in the powertrain 
field. Generally speaking, what would be changed significantly is not the prevalence of diesel 
engines (actually linked to final customers’ choices and culture), but the proportion of 
medium-high displacement gasoline engines, together with the doubling of 4-cylinder 
engines , while halving the total number of engine families. 
The focus on the World Class Manufacturing (WCM) philosophy, which was extended 
progressively to all Fiat-Chrysler and Fiat Industrial plants, was expected to yield substantial 
savings, first of all in terms of product quality and reliability. It was anticipated that Fiat and 
Fiat Industrial, quite experienced in WCM, would generate 1.9 billion Euros of savings in 
the period 2010-2014. Chrysler, which implemented the WCM approach just after the 
acquisition by Fiat, had a target of 1 billion Euros of cumulative savings during the period 
2010-2014.  
The merger of the purchasing needs of three actors as significant as Fiat SpA, Fiat 
Industrial and Chrysler made it possible to reach a mass large enough to generate consistent 
savings on purchases. While in 2009, the total volume of purchasing generated by the 
combination of Fiat and Fiat Industrial exceeded 20 billion Euros, in 2011, it exceeded 50 
billion. In terms of savings from purchasing volume improvement, in the period 2010-2014, 
it is expected that Fiat-Chrysler and Fiat Industrial will reach total savings of over 5 billion 
Euros, with an average of 2.1%-2.2% every year.  
As stated above, one of the main issues faced by companies operating in a mature market 
such as the automotive one is that of becoming slow in taking decisions and thus failing to 
react effectively to market change. Another issue is that the prevailing functionality of 
products in the automotive market now exceeds that which can be utilized by customers 
(Christensen, 2001). Consequently, making even better products no longer yields superior 
profits. Instead, innovations that enhance a company’s ability to bring products rapidly to 
market – and to customize offerings in a responsive, useful manner – become the mechanism 
for achieving an advantage. It is well known that one of the Fiat Group’s main and historical 
advantages is its extremely compressed timing for new model development. Following a 
continuous series of development process refinements, the Fiat Group is now able to achieve 
a market launch from technical release in 18 months. This timeframe, which enables the 
Group to be relatively faster in responding to market demands than its competitors, is 
achieved by means of a series of strategies, including the extensive use of virtual simulation 
instruments, structuring of the engineering process, early involvement of suppliers, and 
standardization of components and architectures. This approach, and the consequent 
advantages, was also intended to be shared with Chrysler, where development timing offers 
wide margins for improvements (of up to five months less) (Fiat Investor Day, 2010). 
Finally, Fiat-Chrysler is expected to offer a wider and more diversified product mix offer, 
minimizing (but not eliminating) the gap between with the average product mix on the 
European market. Taking into account data from September 2011, the relative weight of low 
segments has decreased progressively in favor of segments with less coverage historically, 
such as the compact segment and SUVs (thanks to the fundamental contribution of the Jeep 
brand). 
In relation to the advantages of M&As already mentioned, as highlighted by Grinblatt 
and Titman (Grinblatt, Titman, 1998), namely operating synergies, market-power hypothesis 
motivations, disciplinary takeovers and tax motivations, most of the abovementioned gains 
can be recognized in the Fiat-Chrysler deal. Fiat acquired a competitor (strictly speaking, not 
a direct one), introduced a more effective approach to management in Chrysler and achieved 
several operating synergies. Generally speaking, through the acquisition of Chrysler, Fiat 
turned from a niche player (i.e. Italy/Brazil and A/B small car segment) into a ‘full liner’ 
automotive car company. Moreover, the industrial plan presented by Fiat in April 2010 in 
Turin was a mirror image of the Chrysler plan, which was presented in November 2009 in 
Detroit. By utilizing each company’s strengths and core competences, both plans were 
directed at creating the most unified strategic partnership, aiming for an ‘operational’ merger 
before a more comprehensive financial tie-up could be considered. 
After the alliance with General Motors (which secured the survival of the Opel brand, 
thanks to technology from Fiat Power Train), Fiat attempted to meet global challenges with 
a new covenant and with a different form. This was no longer a joint venture, but rather a 
progressive real merger with Chrysler. The aim was to create common synergies in terms of 
brand management. In North America, Chrysler allowed Fiat and, subsequently, Alfa 
Romeo to make use of its sales and service network. In South America, it will be Jeep and 
Chrysler that benefit from Fiat’s leadership in markets such as Brazil. In Europe, however, 
Fiat will remain a generalist brand which is dependent on the lower part of the market, 
supported by the 500 brand, which will continue to develop its own distinct identity. Alfa 
Romeo will be a leading player in the medium-high part of the market, positioning itself 
through the characteristics of sportiness and elegance. It is likely that Lancia will be 
sacrificed, as a result of the overlap with Chrysler, which has a similar identity. Ypsilon 
marketing in the UK is under the American brand. Jeep, on the other hand, will form the 
basis from which to extrapolate 4x4 technology and know-how for be transfer to the SUV 
(Sport Utility Vehicle) segment. Given the trend over recent years, it will no longer be a 
market niche, as in the past, but represent a real and autonomous segment (Balcet, 2013). 
The aim is to produce at least 6 million cars every year, as stated by Sergio Marchionne 
(CEO of Chrysler and FGA) (Reuters, 2014). In order to achieve this goal, it is essential to 
revisit how operations are managed on a global level and optimize the use of all available 
resources, implementing world class manufacturing, increasing the production scale, 
reducing times to market, and standardizing components (Roveda, 2013). The 
standardization process is carried out by Fiat, which is currently moving towards the 
adoption of only five platforms, mainly for the Mini, Small and Compact size. 
The most significant size for the competitive strategy should be the Compact, which in the 
past emerged from the Bravo and Delta models, and now, in its latest evolution, forms the 
backbone of the Giulietta model. Moreover, thanks to a number of modifications, it was 
adopted by the Fiat Linea and the Dodge Dart. This is the first product to be developed 
entirely under the auspices of the new FGA- Chrysler (Balcet et al., 2013). 
Brief critical summary of the case 
              Taking into account the approach suggested by Colombo and Conca (2001), the more 
recent Fiat-Chrysler case appears to be an integration process of one partner, with another 
that needs to be restructured in order to gain profitability. Thus, on the one hand, Chrysler 
was in a very difficult situation in 2009 restructuring was necessary for it to recover positive 
industrial and financial results. On the other hand, integration between Fiat and Chrysler was, 
and still is, necessary for achieving and optimizing the advantages from the acquisition. A 
mixture of both the abovementioned “top-down” and “bottom-up” approaches was therefore 
applied. Fiat shared its top management with the Chrysler Group and imposed a turnaround 
on the latter. At the same time, management from Chrysler was involved from the outset in 
the restructuring process, and the Group Executive Council of Fiat-Chrysler was opened up 
to managers from both organizations.  
Moreover, some managers from Fiat were asked to join Chrysler’s teams to help with the 
process of integration and share their competencies, and vice-versa. Generally speaking, the 
basic approach adopted for defining the new Chrysler organization was to make the best 
possible use of local resources, thereby minimizing the introduction of managers from Fiat 
(five Italian team members out of 26 in Chrysler’s top management team). 
On the first day Marchionne made a speech to all Chrysler employees in which he set out the 
objectives (Marchionne, 2008): 
1. “With your leadership, here’s what we’ll see: 
a. A company with the ability to move and change, with individuals who know how to 
adapt, react quickly and outpace the competition. 
b. Within 90 days we’ll have defined a full-line product portfolio for each brand that 
will line up with the best in the world – from the smallest world-class sub-compact 
cars to the largest hybrid Ram pickups. 
c. A manufacturing organization that is absolutely world class. 
d. A vehicle development organization that is working at its peak, as we launch one 
new product after another. 
e. A procurement organization that will achieve savings on components shared 
across a volume global product line with common architectures and common cost 
targets. 
f. Growing international sales. 
g. A flat Chrysler organization that makes decisions, that takes action and offers 
opportunities for anyone with the talent and will to make a strong contribution. 
h. Do all of that, and within 36 months we’ll have a new Chrysler that meets its 
financial, moral and ethical obligations … and establishes itself as the best car 
company in North America. “  
From an industrial perspective, the product philosophies of Fiat and Chrysler were 
fairly similar; to produce popular cars for their respective market (not considering Maserati 
and Ferrari). Contrary to the Daimler-Chrysler case, the reference markets and product 
segment distribution of Fiat and Chrysler were in fact complementary, and no harm would 
be done to the partner’s brand image through the integration process. 
 
3. Conclusions 
 
From the above case, it appears that one of the main issues that needs to be addressed 
in the quest for a successful cross-border merger is a higher degree of integration of the two 
merging entities, from industrial and financial points of view. Products and markets therefore 
need to be complementary and compatible, so that the positive effects of economies of scale 
through the sharing of purchasing and technologies can be fully leveraged. Finally, in order 
to achieve a satisfactory level of integration, both entities must be willing and able to work 
together and focus on the same overall objective. 
In the Fiat-Chrysler case, both Groups were highly motivated achieve a common goal. 
On the one hand, for Fiat, the deal represented the ideal occasion for a revolution of its 
strategy, offering excellent growth opportunities for the Group. On the other hand, Chrysler 
received some funding from the U.S. government, on the condition that it achieve a 
satisfactory turnaround, for which it needed the rightpartner. The alternative for Chrysler 
would have been bankruptcy. 
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